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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Baljinder Singh achieved what many immigrants to our 
country seek: he became a naturalized citizen.  Unfortunately, 
he did so through willful misrepresentation, and, as a 
consequence, his citizenship was revoked.  Before that 
revocation and while he was still a citizen, he was convicted of 
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 
illegal drugs.  That led the government to initiate removal 
proceedings against him, and he was in fact ordered to be 
removed.  Singh now petitions for review of that final order of 
removal, arguing that the pertinent statutory provisions, by 
their terms, permit removal only of individuals who were 
“aliens” at the time of their criminal convictions, whereas he 
was a naturalized citizen when convicted.  The government 
responds that we must defer to the interpretation given by the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) to those statutes and 
therefore must deny the petition for review.  In the alternative, 
the government contends that Singh should be treated as if he 
had never been naturalized and was actually an “alien” at the 
time he was convicted.  We disagree with both of the 
government’s arguments and will grant Singh’s petition for 




Singh is a native of India who arrived in the United 
States in 1991.  Upon arriving without travel documents or 
proof of identity, he falsely claimed that his name was 
Davinder Singh.  The agency then responsible for 
administering our nation’s immigration laws, the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (“INS”), initiated exclusion 
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proceedings against him.  Singh failed to appear at his 
scheduled immigration hearing in January 1992, and an 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered him deported in absentia.     
 
Despite that deportation order, in February 1992, Singh 
filed an asylum application under the name Baljinder Singh.  
While the application was pending, he married a U.S. citizen.  
Singh also petitioned to adjust his status from alien to lawful 
permanent resident but did not disclose his prior immigration 
history and deportation order in his application.  In 1998, the 
INS approved his petition, and he received lawful permanent 
resident status.  
 
When Singh later sought naturalization, he again failed 
to disclose his prior immigration history, despite being directly 
asked whether he had ever used other names or lied to gain 
entry to the United States.  He falsely answered those questions 
in the negative, and did so under penalty of perjury.  Singh’s 
citizenship application was approved, and on July 28, 2006, he 
became a citizen of the United States.     
 
Soon, however, he was in serious trouble with the law.  
In 2011, he pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess 
with intent to distribute heroin, MDMA,1 and marijuana, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(l), 841(b)(l)(A)(I), and 
 
1 MDMA, short for 3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine, is also sometimes called 
“ecstasy” and is a psychoactive drug listed as a schedule I 
controlled substance.  Drug Scheduling, U.S. DRUG 
ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/drug-scheduling 
(last visited March 29, 2021). 
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841(b)(l)(C).  His drug dealing lasted from at least September 
2007 to November 2008.     
 
Several years later, the government filed a complaint to 
revoke Singh’s citizenship in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey, invoking 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) and 
stating two independent reasons why his citizenship should be 
revoked: first, he illegally procured naturalization because he 
was never lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and 
second, he procured naturalization by concealment of a 
material fact or willful misrepresentation.  The government 
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment.  The court 
granted that motion on January 5, 2018, and revoked Singh’s 
citizenship, “order[ing] that the Certificate of Naturalization ... 
issued to Defendant on July 28, 2006 is hereby cancelled.” 
(A.R. at 276.) 
 
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served 
Singh with a notice to appear in immigration court, charging 
him with removability under 8 U.S.C § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (the 
“aggravated felony provision” of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”)) for having been convicted of an 
offense relating to illicit trafficking in controlled substances, 
and under 8 U.S.C § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (the “controlled 
substances provision” of the INA) for having been convicted 
of a controlled substances crime.  DHS later filed an additional 
charge of removability, saying Singh was removable under the 
aggravated felony provision for having been convicted of a 
felony relating to conspiracy to illicitly traffic controlled 
substances.     
 
Singh responded with a motion to terminate the removal 
proceedings.  He argued that he could not be removed under 
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the aggravated felony provision because he was a naturalized 
citizen at the time of his conviction, and he said his subsequent 
loss of citizenship could not retroactively make him an “alien.”  
DHS successfully opposed the motion before the IJ, and Singh 
filed a motion to reconsider, which the IJ denied.     
 
The IJ held Singh removable both for having been 
convicted of an aggravated felony as described in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(U), namely conspiracy to commit a controlled 
substances offense, and for having been convicted of a 
controlled substances offense.  Singh was therefore ordered to 
be removed to India.   
 
He appealed, but the BIA accepted the IJ’s conclusions 




Singh argues that he cannot be removable under the 
aggravated felony or controlled substances provisions of the 
INA because he was a naturalized citizen at the time he was 
 
2 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(b)(3), and we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a), though our jurisdiction to review a final order of 
removal based on the commission of an aggravated felony or a 
controlled substances offense is limited to “constitutional 
claims or questions of law[.]”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D).  
We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, unless 
Chevron deference applies.  Sambare v. Att’y Gen., 925 F.3d 




convicted.3  He contends that the only relevant time is the time 
of conviction, and because he was not an “alien” at that time, 
he is not removable under either provision.  See 8 U.S.C. 
 
3 The aggravated felony provision, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), provides:  
 
(a) Classes of deportable aliens - Any 
alien (including an alien crewman) in and 
admitted to the United States shall, upon 
the order of the Attorney General, be 
removed if the alien is within one or more 
of the following classes of deportable 
aliens: ... (2) Criminal offenses (A) 
General crimes ... (iii) Aggravated felony 
- Any alien who is convicted of an 
aggravated felony at any time after 
admission is deportable. 
 
The controlled substances provision, 8 U.S.C 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), provides: 
 
(B) Controlled substances – (i) 
Conviction - Any alien who at any time 
after admission has been convicted of a 
violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to 
violate) any law or regulation of a State, 
the United States, or a foreign country 
relating to a controlled substance (as 
defined in section 802 of Title 21), other 
than a single offense involving possession 
for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana, is deportable. 
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§ 1101(a)(3) (“The term ‘alien’ means any person not a citizen 
or national of the United States.”).  Central to Singh’s 
argument is the Supreme Court decision in Costello v. INS, 376 
U.S. 120 (1964), which held that a similarly-phrased 
deportation provision did not apply to a person who was a 
naturalized citizen at the time he was convicted but who was 
later denaturalized for fraud, like Singh.  Costello, 376 U.S. at 
121-22. 
 
Singh argues that the BIA erred by declining to follow 
Costello and by instead relying on Matter of Rossi, 11 I. & N. 
Dec. 514 (BIA 1966), and Matter of Gonzalez-Muro, 24 I. & 
N. Dec. 472 (BIA 2008), two decisions in which the BIA 
distinguished Costello even though the respondents were 
naturalized citizens at the time they were convicted of 
deportable offenses, just as Costello was.  In addition, Singh 
argues that the BIA erred by saying his circumstances were 
indistinguishable from those of the respondent in Gonzalez-
Muro, who was a lawful permanent resident during the 
commission of the crimes but a naturalized citizen at the time 
of conviction.  Finally, Singh contends that Rossi and 
Gonzalez-Muro conflict with Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 
356 (2010), which held that failure to advise a non-citizen 
criminal defendant that pleading guilty may result in 
deportation constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and 
violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.   
 
The government responds that we must defer to the 
BIA’s ruling in this case because it was directly controlled by 
precedential BIA decisions.  Waiving any argument based on 
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the controlled substances provision of the INA,4 the 
government focuses on the aggravated felony provision and 
says the familiar Chevron rule of deference applies.5  The 
government reasons that the aggravated felony provision is 
ambiguous and the BIA’s interpretation of the provision is 
reasonable, and hence that interpretation is controlling.  The 
government also points to the Rossi decision’s reliance on 
United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 
(1950), which it argues is more analogous to Singh’s 
circumstances than is Costello.   
 
Our analysis of the parties’ conflicting positions 
proceeds in three steps.  We first review Costello and 
Eichenlaub, the two Supreme Court decisions interpreting 
whether deportation statutes cover individuals who were 
 
4 The government waived any argument as to the 
controlled substances provision by failing to brief it.  Khan v. 
Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 495 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[A]n issue 
is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for 
those purposes a passing reference to an issue will not suffice 
to bring that issue before this court.” (quoting Skretvedt v. E.I. 
DuPont DeNemours, 372 F.3d 193, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2004))).   
 
5 As discussed in greater detail herein, infra section 
II.B., Chevron deference involves a two-step inquiry.  At step 
one, we ask whether the statute at issue “is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the specific issue[.]”  Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 
F.3d 185, 198 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).  If the 
statute is ambiguous, we ask, at step two, whether the BIA’s 




citizens at the time of conviction but were subsequently 
denaturalized.  Next, we discuss whether Chevron deference 
applies.  Then, having determined that it does not, we consider 
whether the text of the aggravated felony provision, as 
understood in light of Supreme Court precedent, provides for 
the removal of individuals who were citizens at the time of 
conviction.  
 
A. Applicable Supreme Court precedent. 
 
The Supreme Court has twice considered whether 
deportation provisions using the term “aliens” apply to 
individuals who were naturalized citizens at the time they were 
convicted of crimes but subsequently were denaturalized for 
having acquired their citizenship through fraud or willful 
misrepresentation.  See Costello, 376 U.S. at 128; Eichenlaub, 
338 U.S. at 532.  Singh argues that the petitioner in Costello 
was held to be not deportable because he was a citizen when 
convicted, which is precisely his own circumstance.  The 
government contends that Costello does not apply because it 
was predicated on a specific legal remedy – a judicial 
recommendation against deportation – that has since been 
abrogated and was never available to Singh.  Instead, says the 
government, Singh’s case is akin to Eichenlaub, a case in 
which one-time citizens were deemed deportable.   
 
Eichenlaub is the earlier opinion.  In that case, the 
individuals seeking relief were naturalized citizens convicted 
of conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917.  
Eichenlaub, 338 U.S. at 523.  They were subsequently 
denaturalized for procuring their citizenship by fraud.  Id.  The 
Supreme Court held them deportable under a statute directed 
at “all aliens who since August 1, 1914, have been or may 
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hereafter be convicted” of violations of the Espionage Act.  Id. 
at 523-27 (quoting Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 197, 41 Stat. 593).  
The Court said that the plain language of the statute did not 
“limit its scope to aliens who have never been naturalized[,]” 
id. at 528, and that Congress’s decision to not make a 
distinction between aliens who had never been naturalized and 
those who were naturalized but later denaturalized indicated 
the statute “is applicable to all such offenders.”  Id. at 530.  It 
decided that there were national security implications to the 
case that had to be considered and it also noted that a contrary 
holding would allow a denaturalized alien “to set up a canceled 
fraudulent status as a defense, and successfully ... claim 
benefits and advantages under it.”  Id. at 531-32.  While ruling 
largely for the government, the Court nevertheless rejected the 
government’s urging to “give a retroactive effect to the 
denaturalization orders[.]”  Id. at 529-30.  It based its holding 
instead on the interpretation of the plain text of the statute.  Id. 
 
In Costello, the Supreme Court addressed a since-
revised deportation provision which, though focused on crimes 
of moral turpitude, bears important textual similarities to the 
aggravated felony provision before us now.  The Court 
considered whether that former section of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(a)(4), now amended and located at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), applied to someone who was a naturalized 
citizen when he was convicted of income tax evasion but who 
was later denaturalized on the ground that his citizenship had 
been acquired by willful misrepresentation.  Costello, 376 U.S. 
at 121.  Similar to the aggravated felony provision, the “moral-
turpitude” deportation provision provided that “[a]ny alien in 
the United States ... shall ... be deported who ... at any time 
after entry is convicted of two crimes involving moral 




The Costello Court considered the provision’s statutory 
language, the relevance of Eichenlaub, legislative history, the 
statutory scheme, and the rule of lenity.  Id. at 122-28.  It held 
that the statute’s present tense verbiage—“is convicted”—and 
the phrase “at any time after entry” did not resolve whether the 
petitioner was subject to removal under the statute at issue.  Id. 
at 122, 125 (emphasis added).  The Court distinguished 
Eichenlaub, finding it “evident” from the past tense verb in the 
statute at issue there and clear legislative history evincing 
intent to deport “denaturalized citizens along with aliens ... for 
specific crimes involving national security[,]” that deportation 
was in order in that case.  Id. at 123-24.  None of those 
considerations, however, were implicated by the statute the 
Costello Court faced.  Id. at 124.   
 
Because the language and history of the statute did not 
resolve the ambiguity the Costello Court perceived in it,6 the 
Court turned to a specific legal remedy available to the 
 
6 The Court specifically referenced the “ambiguity of 
the statutory language” as one conveying two “possible 
readings of the statute[.]”  Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 124-
25 (1964).  It “t[ook] a different view” from the court of 
appeals, which found “no ambiguity ... and no room for 
interpretation or construction.”  Id. at 122-23 (citation and 
quotation mark omitted).  And it painstakingly distinguished 
the moral-turpitude deportation provision from the statute at 
issue in Eichenlaub, which, in contrast, was viewed by the 
Court “as una[m]biguously authorizing deportation.”  Id. at 
123.  All of this was, of course, two decades before Chevron 




petitioner to reach its holding.  That legal remedy, the judicial 
recommendation against deportation (“JRAD”), allowed a 
sentencing court to recommend that an alien should not be 
deported even if statutorily eligible for that consequence.  Id. 
at 126.  The Court reasoned that, if the deportation provisions 
of the statute at issue “were construed to apply to those 
convicted when they were naturalized citizens, the protective 
provisions of [the JRAD] would, as to them, become a dead 
letter” because sentencing courts lacked jurisdiction to make a 
JRAD recommendation on behalf of a citizen.  Id. at 127.  The 
Court said it would “hesitate” before adopting the 
government’s construction of the statute as that interpretation 
would “completely nullify a procedure so intrinsic a part of the 
legislative scheme” for “an entire class of aliens.”  Id. at 127-
28.  
 
Then, looking at the rule of lenity,7 the Court continued: 
“If, however, despite the impact of [the JRAD provision], it 
should still be thought that ... the matter [was] in some doubt, 
we would nonetheless be constrained by accepted principles of 
statutory construction in this area of the law to resolve the 
doubt in favor of the petitioner.”  Id. at 128 (emphasis added).  
The magnitude of the penalty of deportation warranted 
application of the rule of lenity, thus giving the benefit of 
ambiguity to the petitioner, not the government.  The Court 
declared, “we will not assume that Congress meant to trench 
on [the petitioner’s] freedom beyond that which is required by 
 
7 The rule of lenity in the immigration context is “the 
longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities 
in deportation statutes in favor of the alien.”  I.N.S. v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (citations omitted). 
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the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.”  
Id. (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).   
 
The Costello Court also rejected the government’s 
alternative argument, under which the petitioner’s citizenship 
would be considered a nullity from the start because 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1451(a) provides that an order of denaturalization “shall be 
effective as of the original date” of the naturalization order.  Id. 
at 128-29 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)).  The government 
contended that the cancellation of the petitioner’s certificate of 
naturalization related back to the year of his original 
naturalization, thus making him an alien at the time he was 
convicted.  Id. at 129.  The Court called the “relation-back 
concept ... a legal fiction at best,” and found no indication in 
the text or history of § 1451(a) that Congress intended it to 
apply to “the general deportation provisions of the [INA].”  Id. 
at 129-30.  Instead, the Court explained that Congress codified 
existing case law that denaturalization related back to the date 
of naturalization “for the purpose of determining rights of 
derivative citizenship,” not for “construing a deportation 
statute.”  Id.  The relation-back “fiction” had been effectively 
rejected in Eichenlaub, and the Court adhered to that.  Id. at 
130.   
 
B. We need not defer to the BIA’s decision under 
 Chevron. 
 
We next consider whether we must defer to the BIA’s 
ruling in Singh’s case.  Although we do not afford Chevron 
deference to nonprecedential BIA decisions, see Da Silva v. 
Att’y Gen., 948 F.3d 629, 633 (3d Cir. 2020), the government 
argues that the BIA’s decision interpreting the aggravated 
felony provision in Singh’s case is entitled to deference 
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because it is directly controlled by the BIA’s precedential 
decisions in Rossi and Gonzalez-Muro.  We agree at least that 
the Chevron framework is applicable to determine whether 
deference is warranted.8  See Mejia-Castanon v. Att’y Gen., 
931 F.3d 224, 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2019) (deferring to a 
nonprecedential BIA decision that relied on a precedential BIA 
decision).  But Singh prevails within the context of the two-
step Chevron inquiry.   
 
8 There are certain situations in which Chevron 
deference is not applicable as a threshold matter, but Singh’s 
arguments do not persuade us that this is one.  He first argues 
that we should not defer to the agency because Costello 
controls our analysis.  But the Supreme Court declared that “a 
court’s prior interpretation of a statute ... override[s] an 
agency’s interpretation only if the relevant court decision held 
the statute unambiguous.”  Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 984 (2005).  Because 
that question turns on whether the prior case viewed the statute 
as delegating gap-filling power to the agency through 
ambiguous language, it is better suited for discussion at the first 
step of Chevron.  See United States v. Home Concrete & 
Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 488-89 (2012). 
Nor are we persuaded by Singh’s remaining arguments 
that the government waived the application of Chevron for 
failure to raise it previously or that this case implicates such an 
“extraordinary” issue that Congress would not have delegated 
it to an agency.  Cf. King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485-86 
(2015) (declining to defer where the interpretation of 
Affordable Care Act’s tax credit provision “involv[ed] billions 
of dollars in spending each year and affect[ed] the price of 




1. Chevron Step One 
The first step of the Chevron inquiry requires us to ask 
whether the statute is ambiguous as to Singh’s removability.  
Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 197 (3d Cir. 2008).  If 
Congress did not leave the statute ambiguous as to the specific 
issue under consideration, we do not defer to the agency’s 
interpretation.  Id.  “In discerning congressional intent, we look 
first to the plain text of the statute.” Cazun v. Att’y Gen., 856 
F.3d 249, 255 (3d Cir. 2017).   
 
The aggravated felony provision provides:  
 
(a) Classes of deportable aliens - Any alien 
(including an alien crewman) in and admitted to 
the United States shall, upon the order of the 
Attorney General, be removed if the alien is 
within one or more of the following classes of 
deportable aliens: ... (2) Criminal offenses (A) 
General crimes ... (iii) Aggravated felony - Any 
alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at 
any time after admission is deportable. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  The INA defines the term 
“alien” to mean “any person not a citizen or national of the 
United States.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).  As someone who was 
a naturalized citizen at the time of his conviction, Singh argues 
that the aggravated felony provision unambiguously excludes 
him, as Congress limited the reach of that provision to those 
who were aliens at the time of conviction.  The government 
contends that, to the contrary, the aggravated felony provision 
is ambiguous because it allows for two plausible 
interpretations: one applying to any person who was an alien 
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at the time of conviction for the removable offense, and the 
other applying to any person who is now an alien, regardless 
of his or her citizenship status at the time of conviction for the 
offense. 
 
The government’s position requires some suspension of 
disbelief.  After all, the statute is expressly directed at “aliens,” 
and one who is a citizen is, by definition, not an alien.  It would 
seem there is no ambiguity there.  The natural reading of the 
passive voice, present tense verb (“[a]ny alien who is 
convicted”) indicates it is important that citizenship status be 
assessed as of the time of conviction.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  The Supreme Court’s distinguishing of 
the Eichenlaub statute’s past tense verb buttresses that 
interpretation, since aliens who “have been” convicted need 
not have been aliens at the time of conviction to fit within that 
linguistic scope.  Costello, 376 U.S. at 123.  And for the 
reasons explained in Costello, the phrase “at any time after 
admission” would not violate the presumption against 
superfluity if the statute required the individual facing removal 
to have been an alien at the time of conviction, as it could be 
read to permit the removal of aliens who were not originally 
excludable but were convicted after admission.  Id. at 125; 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).   
 
In addition, “‘our duty to construe statutes, not isolated 
provisions,’ means that definitions in other parts of the INA 
may also shed light on what Congress envisioned[.]”  Si Min 
Cen v. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 177, 193 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 568 (1995)).  We 
“‘normally’ give ‘identical words and phrases within the same 
statute … the same meaning,’” id. (quoting Powerex Corp. v. 
Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007) 
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(alteration in original)), and the corollary of that canon is 
equally true: parallel provisions in the same statute utilizing 
different words suggest differing meanings.  Russello v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion.” (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted)).  Thus, when we see, in contrast to the phrase “is 
convicted” in the aggravated felony provision, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), the use of the past tense “has been 
convicted” elsewhere in the INA, it lends further support to the 
conclusion that the aggravated felony provision excludes 
Singh.  For example, the controlled substances provision 
permits deportation of any alien who “has been convicted[.]” 8 
U.S.C § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added).  Congress’s choice 
of a different verb tense in a parallel deportation provision of 
the INA demonstrates that the aggravated felony provision 
only applies to individuals who were aliens at the time of 
conviction.   
 
All of that would lead us to agree with Singh that, as a 
textual matter, the aggravated felony provision unambiguously 
excludes him from its reach.  But our analysis does not end 
there.  The government is quick to point out that the Supreme 
Court in Costello held the text of the similarly worded moral-
turpitude provision was ambiguous.  And the government 
contends that we should accept that finding of ambiguity, but 
not Costello’s holding against deportability, as “[a] court’s 
prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency 
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if 
the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from 
the unambiguous terms of the statute[.]”  Nat’l Cable & 
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Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
982 (2005).  That is the sum total of the government’s 
reasoning on this point.  It offers no independent textual 
analysis of the aggravated felony provision but simply relies 
on Costello’s reference to ambiguity in the moral-turpitude 
provision.  It likes that much of Costello, but only that much.  
And it is true that the two removal provisions have similar 
wording and identical purposes—describing what types of 
crimes render aliens removable if the aliens are convicted.   
 
We thus find ourselves in the difficult position of 
looking at statutory text that seems plain to us but is very 
similar to language declared by the Supreme Court to be 
ambiguous, although that declaration came long before 
Chevron imbued the notion of ambiguity with the 
transformative power it now has.  To utter the word 
“ambiguous” today is to shift authority for statutory 
interpretation from the judicial to the executive branch, which 
makes for quite a large footnote to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 
In Hylton v. Attorney General, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently faced the 
conundrum created by Costello’s invocation of ambiguity, and 
found its way out by saying, “a pre-Chevron recognition of 
linguistic ambiguity does not necessarily establish ambiguity 
in the Chevron sense.”  992 F.3d 1154, 1160 (11th Cir. 2021).  
For that principle, the court relied on a plurality opinion of the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, 
LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 488-89 (2012).  The Supreme Court said 
there that stare decisis may, in certain circumstances, triumph 
over Chevron deference, and it declined to afford deference to 
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an agency’s statutory construction despite statutory 
ambiguity.9  Id. at 488-90.  The Eleventh Circuit took that same 
route in holding that a petitioner in exactly Singh’s position 
was not removable under the aggravated felony provision 
because he was a citizen at the time of conviction.  Hylton, 992 
F.3d at 1160-61.  It reasoned that the “plain meaning” of the 
aggravated felony provision “forecloses the [BIA’s] 
interpretation, and binding precedent, [Costello], forecloses 
treating Hylton’s denaturalization as retroactive for removal 
 
9 The Home Concrete plurality held that a prior pre-
Chevron case, Colony, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28, 33 (1958), 
did not “reflect[ ] a post-Chevron conclusion that Congress had 
delegated gap-filling power to the agency.”  566 U.S. at 488-
89.  The plurality acknowledged that the Colony Court stated 
the statutory language at issue was “not ‘unambiguous[,]’” and 
then posited that “[t]he question is whether the Court in Colony 
concluded that the statute left such a gap.”  Id. at 488-89 
(quoting Colony, 357 U.S. at 33).  It looked to several factors 
to decide that there was no gap for the agency to fill: Colony 
“said that the taxpayer had the better side of the textual 
argument[,]” it viewed the legislative history as demonstrating 
“that Congress had decided the question definitively,” and a 
contrary interpretation “would create a patent incongruity in 
the tax law.”  Id. at 489 (citations and internal quotation marks 
removed). 
In an opinion concurring except as to the plurality’s 
discussion relevant to this issue, Justice Scalia viewed Colony 
in a different light, saying that it made “it inescapably clear 
that the Court thought the statute ambiguous[.]”  Id. at 494 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).   
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purposes.”  Id. at 1156.  It thus granted the petition for review.  
Id. at 1161. 
 
We agree with most of that reasoning but have difficulty 
with one key aspect of the decision.  We have trouble getting 
past Costello’s emphasis on the ambiguity of the nearly 
identical statutory language.  See Costello, 376 U.S. at 124 
(explaining that the parties’ differing interpretations “are both 
possible readings of the statute”); see also Home Concrete, 566 
U.S. at 496 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (warning that, where the prior case interpreting the 
statute “said unambiguously that the text was ambiguous,” a 
later court’s contrary conclusion would “deny stare decisis 
effect to [the prior case] as a pre-Chevron decision”); Marks v. 
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (explaining that a 
plurality holding “may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds[.]” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).   
 
The Hylton court held that the moral turpitude provision 
at issue in Costello “was ambiguous only when read in 
isolation; the ambiguity no longer remained when the language 
was read in its statutory context, as it must be.”  992 F.3d at 
1160.  And, the court continued, reading the language in 
context required resort not only to the JRAD provision, which 
is no longer available, but also to the immigration rule of lenity.  
Id.  That led the court to conclude that, “[w]hen a court 
interprets a statute before the agency does and determines that 
the statute is unambiguous based on the rule of lenity, its 
reading is binding on the implementing agency.”  Id. at 1160-




Rather than follow that line of reasoning, however, we 
can assume without deciding that there is ambiguity at Chevron 
step one, because, at step two, the agency’s construction is 
unreasonable and therefore not entitled to deference.10   
 
10 We are not persuaded that Brand X provides the 
support that the Eleventh Circuit attributes to it for the 
proposition that a court’s statutory interpretation pinned to the 
rule of lenity is free of the strictures imposed by Chevron.  The 
Supreme Court in Brand X was emphatically reenforcing the 
power of Chevron, and in doing so faulted a conclusion of the 
Ninth Circuit indicating that a prior judicial construction of a 
statute was binding on the agency charged with administering 
the statute.  See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 985 (“Before a judicial 
construction of a statute, whether contained in a precedent or 
not, may trump an agency’s, the court must hold that the statute 
unambiguously requires the court's construction.”)  The Brand 
X Court referenced the rule of lenity only in passing, and then 
did so in a way that, while not entirely clear, we take as 
indicating that a court’s refusal to apply the rule of lenity 
presupposes an unambiguous statute.  Id. at 984.  Indeed, 
Brand X cites Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991), 
which emphasizes that the rule of lenity “is not applicable 
unless there is a ‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
language and structure of the Act[.]’”  Id. at 463 (citation 
omitted).  Whether the rule of lenity or Chevron deference 
applies first to resolve ambiguity is an arguable issue, but we 
decline to address it in dicta here.  See Esquivel-Quintana v. 
Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1572 (2017) (declining to “resolve 
whether the rule of lenity or Chevron receives priority”); 
Cazun v. Att’y Gen., 856 F.3d 249, 256 n.14 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(“[W]e have never found that [the rule of lenity] clarifies an 
ambiguous statute ... such that it does away with the need to 
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2. Chevron Step Two 
At step two, we determine whether the BIA’s 
conclusion “is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”  Yusupov, 518 F.3d at 198 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).  
A permissible construction is one that is reasonable.  Id.  We 
do not ask whether the BIA’s statutory interpretation is the best 
possible, but instead “inquire only whether [the agency] made 
‘a reasonable policy choice’ in reaching its interpretation.”  
Mejia-Castanon, 931 F.3d at 235-36 (citations omitted).  
Importantly, deference is not owed to an agency decision that 
lacks reasoning.  See Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 314 (3d Cir. 
2013) (holding agency action was arbitrary and capricious 
“because we cannot discern from the record a reasoned basis 
for the agency’s decision”); Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 
702, 709-10 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining to defer to the BIA at 
Chevron step two because it “entirely fails to explain why” its 
interpretation is reasonable);  TNA Merch. Projects, Inc. v. 
F.E.R.C., 616 F.3d 588, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[A]lthough we 
will defer to a reasonable definition by the [Federal Energy 
Regulatory] Commission, we cannot defer to one that is 
unexplained.”). 
 
Recall that, in Singh’s case, the BIA did not explain its 
interpretation of the removal provision.  It was content to cite 
its earlier decisions in Matter of Rossi, 11 I. & N. Dec. 514 
(BIA 1966), and Matter of Gonzalez-Muro, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
 
proceed to Chevron’s second step”).  Hence our decision to 
assume without deciding that there is ambiguity in the 
aggravated felony provision. 
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472 (BIA 2008), and to assert that “[t]he Supreme Court’s 
concerns in Costello centered around the alien’s ability to 
seek” JRAD relief.  (A.R. at 4.)  But Rossi and Gonzalez-Muro 
do not adequately explain why Costello was not controlling in 
those cases – or why Eichenlaub was.  They assert, without 
discussion, that Costello was primarily concerned with the 
now-defunct JRAD provision, and they ignore entirely the 
careful textual analysis the Supreme Court engaged in while 
distinguishing Eichenlaub.  See Rossi, 11 I. & N. Dec. 514, 
515-16 (BIA 1966) (“[W]e are satisfied that [Costello] was, in 
fact, primarily predicated on the provisions of section 241(b) 
and the fact that Costello, being a naturalized citizen at the time 
of his convictions, was deprived of any opportunity of 
requesting the sentencing court to recommend against his 
deportation.”); Gonzalez-Muro, 24 I. & N. Dec. 472, 473 (BIA 
2008) (citing Rossi’s statement that Costello was “primarily 
predicated” on the availability of the JRAD provision and 
“find[ing] the same to be true in this case, … [so] 
that Costello is also not controlling here”).11   
 
The government reprises that approach in this case.  It 
argues that the BIA’s interpretation of the aggravated felony 
provision was reasonable because Costello’s holding relied on 
the availability of JRAD relief, which was repealed in 1990 and 
therefore unavailable to Singh.  The problem with both the 
 
11 The BIA also noted in Gonzalez-Muro that the 
deportee had committed crimes when he was a lawful 
permanent resident, though he became a naturalized citizen 
before he was convicted, and that was another basis on which 
to distinguish Costello.  24 I. & N. Dec. 472, 473-74 (BIA 
2008).  But that is irrelevant in Singh’s case, as he was a 
naturalized citizen at the time of his crimes.   
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BIA’s analysis and the government’s argument is that Rossi 
didn’t give any reason for its holding except a bare assertion.  
See 11 I. & N. Dec. 514, 515-16 (BIA 1966) (saying, “[a]fter 
careful analysis, … we are satisfied” etc.).  Without 
independent analysis of the removal provision at issue there, 
Rossi simply stated in a conclusory fashion that the JRAD 
provision was the centerpiece of Costello and that the case then 
before it could “[]not be distinguished from” Eichenlaub so 
removal was proper.  Id.   
 
The BIA is free at any time to try to distinguish Costello.  
What it is not free to do is to declare without analysis what 
Costello was “primarily predicated on” and then to embrace 
Eichenlaub without any reasoning.  Rossi, 11 I. & N. Dec. at 
515.  In Rossi, the BIA should have engaged in its own 
interpretation of the pertinent deportation provision, just as in 
Singh’s appeal it should have engaged in its own interpretation 
of the aggravated felony provision.  Moreover, in Rossi, in 
Gonzalez-Muro, and now in this case, it has consistently failed 
to recognize that Costello distinguished Eichenlaub’s holding 
in material ways, such as the espionage deportability 
provision’s use of a past tense verb and a specific time 
limitation, and specific legislative history providing more 
guidance for the Court than the “generalized” legislative 
purpose of broadening deportation of criminal aliens.12  
 
12 The government attempts to liken the Eichenlaub 
statute’s legislative purpose to that of the aggravated felony 
provision by citing the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (the “Act”), which amended the 
aggravated felony definition in order to “increase the severity 
of the consequences for aliens convicted of crimes.”  
(Answering Br. at 35 (quoting Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 
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Costello, 376 U.S. at 124, 126.  As for the aggravated felony 
provision at issue here, it does not use the phrase “all aliens 
who … have been … convicted” and does not provide a 
specific time limitation for convictions like the espionage 
provision in Eichenlaub, nor does its legislative history 
implicate far-reaching national security concerns.  See id. at 
123-25.  The BIA’s implicit conclusion that the aggravated 
felony provision could not be distinguished from the statute at 
issue in Eichenlaub is, like its explicit rejection of Costello, an 
ipse dixit, not a reasoned decision.    
 
 
22 I. & N. Dec. 991, 994 (BIA 1999)).)  That purpose is nearly 
identical to the purpose that the Costello Court found 
“generalized” and unhelpful.  Costello, 376 U.S. at 125-26.   
The government also argues that the Act’s amendment 
to the aggravated felony definition in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), 
which “shall apply to actions taken on or after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, regardless of when the conviction 
occurred[,]” somehow indicates that Congress intended the 
aggravated felony provision of 8 U.S.C § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) to 
include citizens at the time of conviction.  (Answering Br. at 
35-36 (quoting Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546).)  
That argument fails because, had Congress sought to include 
within the aggravated felony provision aliens who were 
naturalized citizens at the time of conviction, it would have 
amended the “any alien who is convicted” language in that 
provision.  But the Act did not amend the aggravated felony 
provision or the definition of “alien” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).  
See Hylton, 992 F.3d at 1161; Okpala v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 




Without an independent analysis of the statutory text, 
and with strong text-based arguments to the contrary, the 
BIA’s decision in Singh’s case appears to be nothing more than 
an unreasoned declaration of law based on earlier unreasoned 
declarations.  It is thus rightly seen as arbitrary.13  See Christ 
the King Manor, Inc., 730 F.3d at 314 (holding that the 
agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious because it did not 
supply a “reasoned basis” for its decision).  Accordingly, we 
decline to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of the aggravated 
felony provision.   
 
C. Singh is not removable under the aggravated 
 felony provision. 
 
Unconstrained by Chevron deference, we hold that, 
since Singh was a naturalized citizen at the time of his 
conviction, he is not removable under the aggravated felony 
provision.14  As noted earlier, the language of that provision is 
 
13 Citing Eichenlaub, the government attempts to 
impute policy considerations to the BIA’s decisions by 
explaining that Congress would not have intended “to permit 
the removal of aliens who never naturalized, but prohibit the 
removal of aliens who naturalized before their convictions[.]”  
(Answering Br. at 38.)  That rationale, however, was 
undermined in Costello, in which the Court said that “it is not 
at all certain” that the petitioner in Costello would have been 
deportable if he had never acquired citizenship, as he could 
have offered to plead guilty to a non-removable offense.  
Costello, 376 U.S. at 130-31. 
 
14 Our concurring colleague says that Singh is not 




any other deportation provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) – 
because he was never “admitted” within the meaning of 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (defining admission as “the lawful 
entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and 
authorization by an immigration officer”).  We agree with 
many of our colleague’s statements:  The word “entry” focuses 
on “the physical act of stepping into the United States[,]” and 
“‘admission’ occurs at the port of entry after inspection[.]”  
(Concur. Op. at 6, 12.)  Those statements establish that Singh 
was admitted, and we need not labor further to arrive at that 
conclusion. 
Singh was admitted in 1991; that is, he physically 
entered the United States through inspection and authorization 
by immigration authorities, as admission is defined under the 
current statutory scheme.  Our colleague’s argument to the 
contrary relies on the definition of “entry” in an outdated 
version of the statute, rather than focusing on the definition of 
“admitted” in the current version.  We are bound, however, to 
apply the law applicable at the time of Singh’s removal 
proceedings.  See Luntungan v. Att’y Gen., 449 F.3d 551, 556 
(3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that the older version of the INA 
applies to aliens whose exclusion or deportation proceedings 
began before April 1, 1997).  (A.R. at 570-73 (providing notice 
to Singh in 2019 to initiate removal proceedings under the 
aggravated felony provision).)  And even if we did turn to the 
old definition of “entry,” Singh would still have been admitted 
within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) because he 
was “free to ... go at large and mix with the general 
population.”  Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540, 1543, 1550 (3d 
Cir. 1995) 
By presenting himself for inspection instead of sneaking 
across the border without detection, he was “admitted” for 
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akin to the statutory language examined in Costello, and a 
sound interpretation of it permits removal of only those 
individuals who were aliens at the time they were convicted by 
a judge or jury.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).   
 
 
purposes of the aggravated felony provision.  See Mauricio-
Vasquez v. Whitaker, 910 F.3d 134, 136 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(“Under the Board’s precedent, a noncitizen is ‘admitted’ to 
the United States for purposes of the INA when she enters with 
‘procedural regularity’ by physically presenting herself at a 
port of entry for inspection and questioning by an immigration 
official. ... [P]rocedural regularity doesn’t require entry on a 
particular visa or status.” (citing Matter of Quilantan, 25 I. & 
N. Dec. 285, 293 (B.I.A. 2010))).  Singh’s entry was 
procedurally regular regardless of his possession, or lack 
thereof, of any valid entry or identity documents.  We have said 
that “[a]dmission is an occurrence, defined in wholly factual 
and procedural terms: An individual who presents himself at 
an immigration checkpoint, undergoes a procedurally regular 
inspection, and is given permission to enter has been admitted, 
regardless of whether he had any underlying legal right to do 
so.”  Sanchez v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 967 F.3d 
242, 250 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Gomez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 
652, 658 (5th Cir. 2016)), aff’d sub nom. Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 
141 S. Ct. 1809 (2021).  While we take our colleague’s point 
that skipping bail is not the same as having a legal right to stay 
in the country, Singh was given permission to enter for a 
limited time and purpose, i.e., for the purpose of adjudicating 
whether he should be excluded and hence sent back out of the 
country.  So we agree with the government and Singh that he 
was “admitted” in the sense contemplated by § 1227(a).   
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To summarize, Congress used a present tense “to be” 
verb plus “convicted” in the aggravated felony provision, 
indicating that the individual facing removal must have been 
an alien at the time of conviction.  Id. (permitting removal for 
“[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any 
time after admission”).  In contrast, as the Costello Court 
explained, a past tense verb, such as that in the statute at issue 
in Eichenlaub, indicates that the individual need not have been 
an alien at the time of conviction to fit within the terms of the 
statute.  Costello, 376 U.S. at 123.  And because Congress 
chose the past tense form of the verb in parallel deportation 
provisions, we may infer that Congress intended to provide for 
different meanings.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) 
(permitting deportation of any alien who “has been 
convicted...”) (emphasis added); Russello, 464 U.S. at 23.  The 
text of the provision and inferences drawn from surrounding 
provisions of the INA prompt the conclusion that Singh may 
not be removed under the aggravated felony provision.   
 
We reiterate that deportation is a “drastic measure[,]” 
requiring us to resolve doubts in favor of the party facing 
removal from the United States.  Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360 
(quoting Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10).15  “[S]ince the stakes 
 
15 Singh argues that an interpretation of the aggravated 
felony provision allowing the removal of only those 
individuals who were aliens at the time of conviction best 
comports with constitutional concerns.  In Padilla v. Kentucky, 
the Supreme Court held that failure to advise a non-citizen 
criminal defendant that pleading guilty may result in removal 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and violates the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010).  
Singh argues that Matter of Rossi and Matter of Gonzalez-
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are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that 
Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is 
required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the 
words used.”  Costello, 376 U.S. at 128 (quoting Fong Haw 
Tan, 333 U.S. at 10).  So, beyond the text of the aggravated 
 
Muro allow those who were citizens at the time of conviction 
to be subsequently removed on the basis of their subsequent 
denaturalization and their convictions, without receiving the 
protection of the right to be warned of the immigration 
consequences of a guilty plea.  That outcome, he says, conflicts 
with his Sixth Amendment right to counsel as described in 
Padilla, as well as his Fifth Amendment right to due process.   
We do not have to decide whether there is irreconcilable 
tension between Padilla on the one hand and Rossi and 
Gonzalez-Muro on the other, because Padilla expressly applies 
only to noncitizens pleading guilty, which Singh was not.  See 
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364 (“The importance of accurate legal 
advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more 
important.” (emphasis added)).  It is true, however, that 
Singh’s case raises a constitutional concern in the spirit of 
Padilla: he is facing removal, “a particularly severe penalty[,]” 
for his conviction from a guilty plea, a guilty plea he made 
without notice of the immigration consequences that could 
flow from the plea.  Id. at 365 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The government contends that “Singh should 
have known that, should his fraud be uncovered, he could be 
found removable.”  (Answering Br. at 54.)  But we do not 
generally premise procedural protections on what a criminal 
defendant “should” know.  It is precisely because many 
criminal defendants do not know the consequences of pleading 




felony provision and the inferences that can be drawn from 
surrounding provisions of the INA, longstanding 
jurisprudential concerns surrounding the severity of removal 
provide additional support for the conclusion that Singh is not 
removable as charged. 
 
Finally, the government cannot succeed on the theory 
that Singh is removable because his denaturalization springs 
back in time to the date he fraudulently obtained his 
citizenship.  The Supreme Court rejected that very argument 
more than half a century ago in Costello, 376 U.S. at 129-32, 
and its decision is controlling.  See Hylton, 992 F.3d at 1161 
(“Because only the Supreme Court may overturn its 
precedents, Costello controls our resolution of this issue.”); 
Okpala v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 965, 970 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(“Costello is not materially distinguishable from the facts at 
hand and thus controls here.”).  Having chosen to pursue 
Singh’s removal solely on the basis of the aggravated felony 
provision,16 the government cannot salvage its case now by 
trying to say that he never was a citizen to begin with and is 
 
16 As noted earlier, supra n.4, there was an alternative 
charge of removal against Singh based on his convictions for 
committing crimes involving controlled substances.  Why the 
government chose not to pursue that charge is not clear in the 
record.  Nothing in our decision today should be taken as 
indicating a lack of appreciation for the seriousness of such 
offenses or as implying that immigration consequences should 









For the foregoing reasons, we will grant Singh’s petition 
for review, vacate the BIA’s order, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
17 Because we agree with Singh that he is not removable 
under the aggravated felony provision, we do not reach his 
other argument that his conviction cannot qualify as a 
“conviction” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) because that 
section defines “conviction” in terms of formal judgment of 
guilt entered against an alien.   
 
MATEY, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
 
 I join the Majority’s conclusion that the aggravated 
felony provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”) does not apply to Singh for a different reason: INA 
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), addresses 
aliens convicted “after admission,” and Singh has never been 
“admitted.” The INA defines “‘admission’ and ‘admitted’ [as], 
with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the 
United States after inspection and authorization by an 
immigration officer.” INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(13)(A). Singh is present in the United States, but not 
through a lawful entry after inspection and authorization. As a 
result, the aggravated felony provision is inapplicable, and his 
petition must be granted.1 
 
 
1 Although Singh did not raise the issue, the parties 
briefed this question at the Court’s request. Kamen v. Kemper 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (“When an issue or 
claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the 
particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather 
retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper 
construction of governing law.”); Haybarger v. Lawrence 
Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 413 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2012) (“[W]e retain the independent power to identify and 
apply the proper construction of governing law. . . . We thus 
may consider an issue antecedent to . . . and ultimately 
dispositive of the dispute before us, even an issue the parties 




To understand why, it is necessary to recount the tale of 
two Singhs. It began in 1991, when “Davinder Singh” (Singh 
1) arrived in the United States at the San Francisco 
International Airport. (A.R at 259–60, 496.) Lacking any travel 
documents, authorities placed Davinder into custody at the 
airport and started exclusion proceedings. After posting a 
bond, Davinder left confinement and vanished. An 
Immigration Judge later ordered Davinder excluded.  
 
 But he never left. One month later, Singh filed an 
asylum application under the name “Baljinder Singh” (Singh 
2). (A.R. at 260, 496.) With the Baljinder application pending, 
Singh married a U.S. citizen and applied for an adjustment of 
status to lawful permanent resident (“LPR”). His adjustment 
application falsely claimed entry into the United States without 
inspection in 1991, failed to disclose that he presented himself 
as Davinder at the port of entry and, of course, omitted the 
exclusion proceedings and the order of removal. The fraud 
worked. In 1998, Baljinder received LPR status, and in 2006, 
Baljinder Singh became a naturalized citizen. Singh’s multiple 
identities remained undiscovered even after his convictions for 
drug crimes. But the tale of two Singhs finally ended in 2018 
when the Government figured out that Singh 1 was probably 
Singh 2, and a court revoked his naturalization for his 
fraudulent LPR application.2  
 
 
2 In the naturalization case, the District Court 
characterized Davinder and Baljinder as the same person. Still, 
as there are no facts in the record confirming Singh’s true 
identity, I will call petitioner simply “Singh.” 
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 Relying on Singh’s drug convictions, the Government 
started removal proceedings under the aggravated felony 
provision in INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). All agree that provision applies only if 
Singh was “admitted.” The majority and the parties believe 
Singh meets that prerequisite. I am not persuaded. 
 
The majority concludes that Singh 1 was admitted when 
released on bond pending his exclusion proceedings. (Maj. Op. 
Part II.C n.14.) But “entry” under the INA does not include 
conditional release. Singh and the Government argue Singh 2 
was admitted when his status was adjusted to LPR. But an 
adjustment of status is not the physical act of entering the 
country, as we have repeatedly recognized and the Supreme 
Court recently confirmed. All of which means neither Singh 1 
nor Singh 2 was ever admitted into the United States within the 




I “begin and end our inquiry with the text” of the law. 
Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 
1010 (2017). Following the course repeatedly recommended 
by the Supreme Court, I use the “fundamental canon of 
statutory construction” that “words generally should be 
interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common 
meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute.” Wis. 
Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018) 
(quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)) 
(alteration in original) (cleaned up). I rely on the “toolkit” 
containing “all the standard tools of interpretation” needed to 
consider the text, structure, and history of the law. Kisor v. 
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414–15 (2019); see also Antonin 
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Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of 
Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 515 (1989). Doing so leads to “‘a 
conclusion about the best interpretation,’ thereby resolving any 
perceived ambiguity.” Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779, 
788 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (quoting Kisor, 139 S. 
Ct. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment)). Here, 
the best meaning of “admission” does not encompass Singh’s 
two-step dance.  
 
A. The INA’s Definition of “Admission” 
 
As noted, the INA defines “[t]he terms ‘admission’ and 
‘admitted’ [to] mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry 
of the alien into the United States after inspection and 
authorization by an immigration officer.” INA 
§ 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). See Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, §  301(a), 110 Stat. 3009–
575 (1996) (defining “admission”). Each component of this 
definition points towards admission as requiring a physical act. 
 
Start with “lawful entry.” Before IIRIRA, the INA 
defined “entry” as “any coming of an alien into the United 
States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying 
possession, whether voluntarily or otherwise[.]” INA 
§ 101(a)(13) (1988); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1988). Although 
IIRIRA replaced “entry” with “admission,”3 “entry” remains a 
 
3 Before IIRIRA, deportability hinged on the concept of 
“entry” rather than “admission,” an important distinction 
because it determined whether an alien faced exclusion or 
deportation. See Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616, 620 (BIA 
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“term of art requiring not only physical presence in the United 
States but also freedom from official restraint.” United States 
v. Argueta-Rosales, 819 F.3d 1149, 1158 (9th Cir. 2016). 
“[T]his principle was established more than a century ago,” id. 
(compiling cases), and its “settled meaning” remains 
applicable today as the INA “still makes numerous references 
to ‘entry,’ including in the new definition of ‘admission’ 
itself.” United States v. Gaspar-Miguel, 947 F.3d 632, 634 
(10th Cir. 2020); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 
21 (1999) (“Where Congress uses terms that have accumulated 
settled meaning under the common law, a court must infer, 
unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to 
incorporate the established meaning of these terms.” (cleaned 
up)).  
 
The phrase “into the United States” confirms that 
admission requires a physical entrance. See The Chicago 
Manual of Style ¶ 5.177 (17th ed. 2017) (“Prepositions signal 
 
1999) (persons without an “entry” into the United States were 
charged as excludable, while those who had made an “entry” 
were deportable); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1988) (former grounds 
for exclusion); id. § 1251(a) (1988) (former grounds for 
deportation). The difference mattered, because those who 
followed the rules and presented themselves for inspection at 
the border did not enjoy the substantive and procedural rights 
that aliens who entered illegally by evading inspection did in 
deportation proceedings. See Martinez v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 
408, 412 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 
26–27 (1982). All of which, of course, encouraged flouting, not 
following, the law. IIRIRA sought to remedy this imbalance by 
creating a uniform removal proceeding. See Martinez, 693 F.3d 
at 413 n.5. 
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many kinds of relationships. For example, a preposition may 
express a spatial relationship {to} {from} {out of} {into}”). 
See also Taveras v. Att’y Gen., 731 F.3d 281, 290 (3d Cir. 
2013) (“The words ‘entry’ and ‘into’ plainly indicate that 
‘admission’ involves physical entrance into the country . . . .”). 
Taken together, the INA did not create a logical or legal fiction 
about entry. Its focus is on the physical act of stepping into the 
United States. 
 
Nor does “inspection” alter this reading. The INA 
explains it is a requirement that “[a]ll aliens . . . who are 
applicants for admission[4] or otherwise seeking admission or 
readmission to . . . the United States shall be inspected by 
immigration officers.” INA § 235(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3). 
Regulations confirm that a “lawful entry” “after inspection and 
authorization by an immigration officer,” 8 U.S.C. 
 
4 An “applicant for admission” is “[a]n alien present in 
the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in 
the United States[.]” INA § 235(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) 
(emphasis added). An “application for admission” is “the 
application for admission into the United States[.]” INA 
§ 101(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(4) (emphasis added). In other 
words, reading these provisions together with INA § 235(a)(3), 
any alien who arrives or is present in the United States without 
the entrance and inspection needed for “admission” becomes 
an “applicant for admission” requiring inspection before being 
granted entry “into” the United States. 
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§ 1101(a)(13)(A), occurs “in person . . . at a U.S. port-of-
entry.” 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(a). 
  
B. Singh 1 Was Never Admitted 
 
Recall the tale of Singh 1. After arriving at San 
Francisco International Airport in 1991 without 
documentation, he was detained, charged as excludable under 
INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), placed in exclusion proceedings, and 
released from confinement on bond. When he failed to appear 
at his January 7, 1992 hearing, he was ordered excluded and 
deported in absentia. Nothing in this sequence constituted an 
“admission” because at no point was Singh permitted “lawful 
entry” into the United States. INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(13)(A). 
 
1. Singh 1’s Arrival Led to Immediate and 
 Continuous Detention 
  
Aliens trying to enter the United States, lawfully or not, 
are seeking “initial entry.” Osorio-Martinez v. Att’y Gen., 
singh, 167 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Castro v. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 449 n.31 (3d Cir. 2016)). Singh, 
upon arrival, had not “accomplish[ed] an ‘entry’ by crossing 
the national boundary in transit or even by arrival at a port 
[because he was] detained there pending formal disposition of 
[his] request[] for admission.” United States v. Vasilatos, 209 
F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 1954). That is because Singh was never 
free from official restraint at “[t]he pre-inspection area at the . 
. . port of entry,” United States v. Vazquez-Hernandez, 849 
F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2017), nor while he was detained. 
See Matter of Lin, 18 I. & N. Dec. 219, 222 (BIA 1982) (alien 
awaiting exclusion proceeding in detention had not “entered” 
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the United States under the INA, even after escape); Argueta-
Rosales, 819 F.3d at 1155. At this point, Singh had not entered 
the country.  
 
 2. Singh 1’s Release on Bond 
  
 What about Singh’s release on bond? The majority says 
this was an admission because Singh was given “permission to 
enter for a limited time and purpose, i.e., for the purpose of 
adjudicating” his exclusion. (Maj. Op. at Part II.C n.14.) But 
that reading contradicts the INA’s “well-established” meaning 
of “entry.” Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540, 1545 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
  
Bond has long been understood as a “transfer [of] 
custody of the defendant from the officers of the law to the 
surety on the bail bond, whose undertaking is to redeliver the 
defendant to legal custody at the time and place appointed in 
the bond.” Bail Bond, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) 
(definition of “bail bond” dating to 17th century). In the 
immigration context, an “immigration delivery bond functions 
as a ‘bail bond[.]’” United States v. Minn. Tr. Co., 59 F.3d 87, 
89 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Bail Bond, Black’s Law 
Dictionary 140 (6th ed. 1990)). That means a “person brought 
into the United States by the authorities, and then released on 
bond, never entered the United States. His case is like that of 
one who had been stopped at the border and kept there all the 
time.” United States ex rel. Ling Yee Suey v. Spar, 149 F.2d 
881, 883 (2d Cir. 1945); see also Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 
230 (1925) (alien awaiting disposition of application for 
admission whose “prison bounds were enlarged by committing 
her to the custody” of caretakers for nine years “was still in 
theory of law at the boundary line and had gained no foothold 
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in the United States”). Release on bond does not render the 
alien free from official restraint, and so fails to satisfy that 
“well-established” prerequisite to accomplishing a lawful 
entry. Yang, 68 F.3d at 1545. 
 
 Congress codified this concept in the INA. The INA 
gives the Attorney General discretion to “parole” into the 
United States aliens who are “applying for admission,” but 
“such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission 
of the alien[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); see id. 
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) (1988) (same language); INA, Pub. L. No. 82-
414, § 212, 66 Stat. 163, 188 (1952) (same language) (codified 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1952)). Once “the purposes of such 
parole” have been served, the alien “shall forthwith return or 
be returned to the custody from which he was paroled” and “be 
dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for 
admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); id. 
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) (1988) (same); id. § 1182(d)(5) (1952) (same); 
see also Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 392 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1999).  
 
 Bond and parole serve the same purpose under the 
INA.5 An alien’s temporary release on parole is, like a release 
on bond, “simply a device through which needless confinement 
 
5 For example, resident aliens arrested can be released 
either on bond or conditional parole pending their removal 
hearing. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 847 (2018) 
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). The Attorney General may revoke 
either basis for temporary release and return the alien to 
custody. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) 
(Supp. 1989) (predecessor provision to § 1226(a)); INA, Pub. 
L. No. 82-414, § 242(a), 66 Stat. 163, 208–09 (1952). 
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is avoided while [exclusion] proceedings are conducted” that 
never “place[s] her legally within the United States.” Leng May 
Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958) (cleaned up); see also 
United States ex rel. Tom We Shung v. Murff, 176 F. Supp. 253, 
256 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding that alien paroled and released 
on bond pending exclusion proceedings was “still, in theory of 
law, ‘on the threshold of initial entry.’” (quoting Shaughnessy 
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953))), aff’d 
sub nom., United States ex rel. We Shung v. Esperdy, 274 F.2d 
667 (2d Cir. 1960) (per curiam).  
 
And “[a]n alien paroled into the United States has not 
‘entered’ the United States for immigration purposes.” Correa 
v. Thornburgh, 901 F.2d 1166, 1169 n.3 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) and collecting cases); see also Vitale 
v. INS, 463 F.2d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that, for the 
period between inspection at the airport to alien’s exclusion 
hearing, “[t]he placing of Vitale in the custody of Alitalia 
Airlines constituted parole; [so] he did not effect an entry into 
the United States”). In other words, “those seeking ‘admission’ 
and trying to avoid ‘exclusion’” may have been “within our 
territory (or at its border), but the law treated them as though 
they had never entered the United States at all.” Sale v. Haitian 
Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 175 (1993) (emphasis 
added). Put it all together and Singh’s conditional, temporary 
release on bond did not accomplish an entry. 
 
Nor did Singh enter the country by skipping out on his 
bond. See Siu Fung Luk v. Rosenberg, 409 F.2d 555, 558–59 
(9th Cir. 1969) (alien in exclusion proceedings whose parole 
was revoked but did not have to appear for two years had still 
not made an entry); Mariscal-Sandoval v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 
851, 855–56 (9th Cir. 2004) (expiration of parole for two-
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month period did not establish an entry); Matter of Lin, 18 I. & 
N. Dec. 219, 222 (BIA 1982) (escaping border detention is not 
an entry). Nothing else in Singh 1’s saga could be treated as 
entry and admission.  
 
3. Singh 1’s 1992 Exclusion 
 
 Any lingering doubt is erased by the 1992 order of 
exclusion. Remember that before Congress amended the INA 
in 1996, exclusion proceedings determined whether aliens like 
Singh would “be allowed to enter” the United States. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(a) (1988); id. § 1226(a) (1994). Aliens who had entered 
the country, by contrast, followed a separate “expulsion” 
procedure “commonly referred to as deportation proceedings.” 
Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 187; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1252(b) 
(1988); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 28 (1982) 
(explaining that “only ‘entering’ aliens are subject to 
exclusion” (citation omitted)); see also Yang, 68 F.3d at 1547. 
Singh 1’s exclusion means he was not “allowed to enter” the 
United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1988), and that means he 
never gained “lawful entry . . . into the United States after 
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” INA 
§ 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added).   
 
C. Singh 2 Was Never Admitted 
 
 Singh and the Government argue that Singh 2’s status 
adjustment to LPR in 1998 was his admission. But that defies 
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the text and structure of the INA as consistently interpreted by 
this Court and recently affirmed by the Supreme Court. 
 
1. Singh 2’s Adjustment of Status Was Not an 
 Admission 
 
 “Lawful status and admission . . . are distinct concepts 
in immigration law: Establishing one does not necessarily 
establish the other.” Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 141 S. Ct. 1809, 
1813 (2021) (citing Sanchez v. Sec’y Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
967 F.3d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 2020)). An “admission” under INA 
§ 101(a)(13)(A) refers to an “event or action,” while being 
“lawfully admitted for permanent residence” under INA 
§ 101(a)(20) refers to “an immigration status.” Hanif v. Att’y 
Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Gomez v. 
Lynch, 831 F.3d 652, 658 (5th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing 
“admission,” which is “an occurrence” where an individual 
“presents himself at an immigration checkpoint” and gains 
entry, with status, which “describes [an individual’s] type of 
permission to be present in the United States”). While an 
“admission” occurs at the port of entry after inspection, 
adjustment of status is “a procedure that is structured to take 
place entirely within the United States.” Taveras, 731 F.3d at 
290; see also INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (provision 
governing adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident); 
8 C.F.R. § 245 (procedure for adjusting status). It “allow[s] an 
alien who is already physically located in the United 
States . . . to obtain lawful permanent resident status while 
remaining within the United States without having to go abroad 
and obtain an immigrant visa at a United States consulate.” 
Taveras, 731 F.3d at 289 (citing Malik v. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 
253, 257 (3d Cir. 2011) (describing status adjustment by 
consular processing)). “Admission” is a prerequisite to 
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obtaining adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). See 
Sanchez, 141 S. Ct. at 1815 (“Section 1255 generally requires 
a lawful admission before a person can obtain LPR status.”).6  
 
Given the INA’s clear distinction between status 
adjustment and admission, “it does not follow that a grant of 
lawful status is an admission.” Sanchez, 967 F.3d at 246. The 
Supreme Court unanimously agrees: a grant of lawful status 
“does not come with a ticket of admission” nor does it 
“constructively ‘admit’” someone. Sanchez, 141 S. Ct. at 1813. 
So we have repeatedly rejected the argument that admission 
and adjustment are the same. Hanif, 694 F.3d at 484–85 
(rejecting Government’s argument); Sanchez, 967 F.3d at 245 
(rejecting petitioner’s).7 
 
6 A few narrow exceptions exist. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(g) 
(treating certain special immigrants who were never 
“admitted” into the United States as “paroled” for purposes of 
status adjustment under § 1255(a)); id. § 1255(i) (permitting 
adjustment of status for aliens who entered the United States 
without inspection in some cases). Congress occasionally 
provides others. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394 (codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1255a) (temporarily permitting adjustment to LPR 
status for aliens who unlawfully entered the United States 
before January 1, 1982). 
7 As have the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits. See 
Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 385–86 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(“admission” and “admitted” “both contemplate a physical 
crossing of the border following the sanction and approval of 
United States authorities” but “simply does not include an 




 Undeterred and oddly united,8 the Government and 
Singh persist in asserting that adjustment of status qualifies as 
an “admission,” pointing to our decision in Martinez v. 
Attorney General, 693 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2012). It is a new twist 
 
(5th Cir. 2008) (“‘admission’ is the lawful entry of an alien 
after inspection, something quite different, obviously, from 
post-entry adjustment of status”); Marques v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 
549, 561 (5th Cir. 2016) (filing for adjustment of status to LPR 
is not an application for admission); Lanier v. Att’y Gen., 631 
F.3d 1363, 1366 (11th Cir. 2011) (the definition of “admitted” 
in INA § 101(a)(13)(A) is “limited[] and does not encompass 
a post-entry adjustment of status”); Ortiz-Bouchet v. Att’y 
Gen., 714 F.3d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) 
(admission under INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) does not include a 
post-entry adjustment of status).  
8 The Government’s argument that Singh’s adjustment 
of status is an “admission” is curious because it conflicts with 
its own policy. See 7 U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Serv., 
Policy Manual, § 2.A.2 (Aug. 12, 2021), 
https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-7-part-b-
chapter-2 (“A noncitizen is admitted if the following 
conditions are met: The noncitizen applied for admission as an 
‘alien’ at a port of entry; and [a]n immigration officer inspected 
the applicant for admission as an ‘alien’ and authorized him or 
her to enter the United States in accordance with the procedures 
for admission.” (citations omitted)). It also contradicts its 
position before us in Sanchez, 967 F.3d at 245 (“According to 
the Government, ‘lawful status’ does not qualify as an 
‘admission’ because the concepts are distinct.”). 
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on the familiar arguments that we rejected in Hanif and 
Sanchez,9 and equally unavailing.  
 
In Martinez, the petitioner first entered the United States 
without inspection and authorization but then left to adjust his 
status at the United States consulate in Nicaragua. 693 F.3d at 
409–410; see also Malik, 659 F.3d at 257 (recognizing that 
aliens may obtain LPR status “through consular processing” 
 
9 And it is an interpretation the BIA has adopted despite 
acknowledging that it defies “the plain language of section 
101(a)(13)(A)” and “has not generally been well received by 
the courts of appeals, including the [] Third Circuit.” Matter of 
Chavez-Alvarez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 274, 276–77 (BIA 2014). But 
since “[w]e owe no deference to the agency’s interpretation of 
these statutes,” Sanchez, 967 F.3d at 246 n.4, there is no reason 
to defer to interpretations that are admittedly unmoored from 
the text of the INA and contrary to Circuit precedent. See 
Lanier, 631 F.3d at 1367 n.3 (finding no ambiguity in the use 
of “admission” in INA § 212(h) and according no deference to 
the BIA’s interpretation that admission includes a post-entry 
adjustment of status). Despite the potentially unwelcome 
results, Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 621, or seemingly 
“absurd consequences” of the unambiguous text, Chavez-
Alvarez, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 276, “we cannot substitute our 
judgment for that of Congress” to avoid the sometimes 
“awkward” situations the law enables. Hanif, 694 F.3d at 487; 
see also New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) 
(“[I]f judges could freely invest old statutory terms with new 
meanings, we would risk amending legislation outside the 
‘single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, 
procedure’ the Constitution commands.” (quoting INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983))). 
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under 8 U.S.C. § 1201(a)). Upon his return to the United States, 
he was “admitted following” the “inspection and authorization 
by an immigration officer at the port of entry.” Martinez, 693 
F.3d at 410, 413 n.6, 416 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)). 
Nothing in Martinez suggests that the petitioner’s adjustment 
of status at the consulate constituted his admission. I decline to 
read Martinez to say what it does not. And that leaves us where 
we started: “bound to follow Congress’s definition in 
§ 1101(a)(13)(A), which defines admission as the physical 
event of entering the country.” Sanchez, 967 F.3d at 250 (citing 
Taveras, 731 F.3d at 290). So Singh 2’s adjustment to LPR was 
not an “admission.”  
 
2. Singh 2’s Fraudulent Adjustment Is Not an 
 Admission 
 
 Even assuming a different reading of the INA, the 
District Court’s finding that Singh obtained his adjustment 
through fraud is the end of the road. “[A]n alien whose status 
has been adjusted to LPR—but who is subsequently 
determined to have obtained that status adjustment through 
fraud—has not been ‘lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence’ because the ‘alien is deemed, ab initio, never to 
have obtained [LPR] status.’” Gallimore v. Att’y Gen., 619 
F.3d 216, 223 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Koloamatangi, 23 I. & 
N. Dec. 548, 551 (BIA 2003)). Even accepting the (false) 
premise that adjustment is admission, Singh’s fraud eliminated 




 Perhaps Singh’s tale is unusual. I can speculate that few 
aliens seeking the privilege of life in the United States follow 
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Singh’s triple-play of criminality attempting an unlawful entry, 
succeeding in a fraudulent adjustment, followed by a 
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 
heroin, MDMA, and marijuana. But Singh’s immigration 
status is not uncommon and many aliens present in this country 
have never been “admitted.” Like Singh, they are all 
“applicants for admission,” INA § 235(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(a)(1), and if they qualify as “inadmissible under [INA 
§] 212[, 8 U.S.C. § 1182],” they are removable. See INA 
§ 240(e)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2); see also 8 C.F.R. 
§ 235.1(f)(2) (“An alien present in the United States who has 
not been admitted or paroled . . . is subject to the provisions of 
[INA §] 212[, 8 U.S.C. § 1182] . . . and to removal”). There are 
many grounds for inadmissibility and removal under INA 
§ 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182, and the Executive Branch regularly 
relies on those grounds for removal actions. 
 
 But for aliens who have been admitted, another section 
of the INA governs their removability. “[I]n the case of an alien 
admitted to the United States, . . . the alien is deportable under 
[INA §] 237[, 8 U.S.C. § 1227].” INA § 240(e)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(e)(2)(B). Section 237 does not apply to those who 
have not been admitted. INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) 
(“Any alien . . . in and admitted to the United States shall . . . be 
removed if the alien is within one or more of the following 
classes of deportable aliens . . . .”). An elegant system or “King 
Minos’s labyrinth in ancient Crete”? Marques v. Lynch, 834 
F.3d 549, 558 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 
38 (2d Cir. 1977)). That is not ours to answer. Nor, following 
the lead of the Government, can we simply skip past Singh’s 
brazen, but successful, sidesteps around the port of entry to 
focus on his thick file of misconduct. One can question the 
wisdom of creating a removability provision exclusive to those 
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who have been “admitted,” and the enforcement system that 
adjusts the status of an alien who, it seems rather obvious, 
barely tried to hide his past. But that only highlights the “perils 
of substituting stories for statutes,” McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 
S. Ct. 2452, 2470 (2020), an expedience that might seem 
attractive in the moment, but risks “upsetting reliance interests 
in the settled meaning of a statute.” New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 
139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019). Congress created a predicable 
framework for the Executive to “faithfully execute[].” U.S. 
Const. art. II, § 3. When the Executive veers from that 
framework, it is this Court’s duty to correct course. 
 
 The Government wants to remove Singh under the 
aggravated felony provision, which resides in INA § 237. For 
that provision to apply, Singh must be admitted. But he never 
was, so the Government’s chosen path is unavailable. For these 
reasons, I concur only in the judgment granting Singh’s 
petition. 
